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

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AN

ANALYTICAL PARAPHRASE

ON THE

REPUBLIC OF PLATO,

BY THE

REV. C. H. HOOLE, M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church.

SECOND EDITION.

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A brief summary of the arguments and doctrines of the Republic, expressed in a direct form, and as far as possible in the words of Plato, is all that is attempted in this Analysis. It it hoped that it may be found useful in fixing the leading lines of thought in the dialogue, and removing some of the indefiniteness which a dramatic form, thrown over what is really direct teaching, has often been found to cause.

MAY 1, 1875.

DIVISIONS OF THE REPUBLIC.

The division of the Republic into books, though not noticed by Aristotle, is certainly of great antiquity: its want of relation to the subject matter renders it improbable that such a division came from Plato himself. It is only with the end of the first book that the first part of the book concludes; and, in like manner, the conclusion of the whole commences with the beginning of the last book; but, beyond this, only the end of the fourth book, and of the seventh, coincide with an important division of the subject matter.

The Republic may be considered as falling into five great divisions.

I. Introductory. A discussion on the nature of Justice: ending with the confession of Socrates, that its nature had not been discovered. Book I.

II. The description of a new form and method by which Justice is to be discovered: i.e., to look at the individual in the State. The application of this method in the foundation of an ideal State, and the explanation by this means of Justice in the individual. Books II. III. IV.

III. Two digressions. The position of women and children in the ideal State. The possibility of its existence, involving a description of the Philosophic Character and Philosophic Education. Books V. VI. VII.

IV. The successive corruptions of the ideal State, and their correlatives in individual character. Final proof that Justice is better than Injustice. Books VIII. IX.

V. Supplementary.

Further reasons for the rejection of imitative art from the ideal State. The immortality of the soul and the future Retribution. Book X.

SPEAKERS IN THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.	CEPHALUS.
GLAUCON.	THRASYMACHUS.
ADEIMANTUS.	SLAVE OF POLEMARCHUS.
POLEMARCHUS.	

A mystical interpretation has been given to these names. Cephalus (the head) opens the Dialogue, Polemarchus begins the discussion, Thrasymachus represents the hardihood and effrontery of the sophists, &c. These personages gradually disperse as the dialogue proceeds, and the discussion is for some time conducted only by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus, but all are summoned together again in the Fourth Book (p. 428), where the search for Justice is recommenced.

The Republic is, in form, a narration by Socrates in the house of Timæus, of a discussion, supposed to have taken place on the preceding evening, at the house of Cephalus, in the Piræus.

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

Introductory. What is Justice?

SOCRATES and Glaucon, as they were returning from the Piræus, whither they had gone to witness the festival of the Goddess Bendis, are stopped by Polemarchus, Niceratus, and others, and persuaded to visit the house of Cephalus the father of Polemarchus. Cephalus is a very old man, and Socrates takes the opportunity of enquiring from him what he thought of old age, was it a rough or an easy path. Cephalus replies that he does not agree with the common complaints on the subject. Like Sophocles he finds it a time of peace and rest. Wealth may add to its comforts, but the great comfort of old age is the consciousness of a well-spent life. The future retribution, which, though before treated with ridicule, has now become an object of serious thought, thus grows a source of hope, not of fear: here again wealth has its advantages, as it diminishes the temptations to violate Justice. Old Age.

Very well, says Socrates, starting off at the word. But one would be glad to know what Justice is. The popular definitions of it seem insufficient. Is it simply truth, or restoring a thing entrusted to our care? Surely not so in every case; no one would say that it was just to restore to a madman a sword which he had left with you while sane. Justice.

Def. I. Justice is giving all their due.

Cephalus here retires. But the discussion is continued by Polemarchus, who brings forward a proverbial expression of Simonides, that Justice is giving all their due. On being pressed by Socrates for greater accuracy of definition, he explains it to mean, to benefit our friends and to injure our enemies. Socrates proceeds to examine the definition. Assuming that Justice is a distinct art, like medicine for instance, he compels Polemarchus to admit that justice is useful only in useless things; for in every art the expert is better able to benefit his friends and to injure his enemies than the just man. Further, as the science of contraries is the same, the just man, who is the best guardian, is also the best stealer of a thing.

Or, benefitting our friends and injuring our enemies.

Polemarchus cannot deny the conclusion, but reasserts his opinion, that Justice is to benefit our friends and injure our enemies. Socrates then assails the definition from another quarter. We do not always know our friends; would it be just to injure those who are doing us good because we fancy them our enemies? Would it not be better to say that Justice is benefitting the friend who is good, and injuring the enemy who is evil?

Def. II. Justice is benefitting the friend who is good, and injuring the enemy who is evil.

Polemarchus accepts the emendation, but Socrates is still not satisfied. Everything that suffers injury becomes worse; and worse in respect to its peculiar virtue. Justice is the peculiar virtue of man; if a man suffer injury he loses his justice and becomes unjust. It cannot be the work of Justice to effect this.

Def. III. Sophistical definition of Justice. Justice is the advantage of the stronger.

At this point of the discussion, Thrasymachus, with an angry censure of the quibbling of Glaucon and Socrates, commands the latter to give him a direct

lefinition of Justice. After a few ironical compliments rom Socrates he is persuaded to give one himself. Justice, he says, is the advantage of the stronger.

But surely not in every case, replies Socrates. Polydamas the boxer is stronger than we are, and beef s an advantage to him, yet it can hardly be said to be Justice.

But not in every case.

Of course, retorts Thrasymachus, I did not mean anything of that kind. What I mean is this. The aws in each state are laid down to secure the advantage of the governing, not of the governed classes. These aws constitute the rule of Justice, which is thus in every case the advantage of the stronger.

The definition explained. Law which constitutes Justice is laid down for the benefit of the governors not of the governed.

Socrates.—Very well. But the stronger man or class is fallible; he may decree what is disadvantageous for himself. In that case it would be just for the inferior to do what was disadvantageous for the stronger.

and discussed.

Thrasymachus.—No, the stronger, so far as he is stronger can never err; should he err the advantage changes hands, though we might still call him the stronger from habit. Thus my definition still holds good.

Socrates.—But it cannot be denied that every art and every artificer quâ it is such, seeks, not its own advantage, but that of the objects on which the art is exercised. The sailor of his ship, the physician of his patient. Government is an art: quâ it is such, it seeks the good, not of the governing, but of the governed.

Thrasymachus.—That may be the theory. But as a mere matter of fact, any one can see that this is not the way in which governments are actually carried on. They are always conducted for the advantage of the

governors, not of the governed, as flocks are kept for the benefit of the shepherd, not of the sheep. If any one will look into the world he will see that Justice is an alien good, the just man's bane, but his neighbour's advantage. Injustice in every degree, most of all in its highest degree, tyranny, is more profitable than Justice; it is merely the fear, not of doing, but of suffering injustice, that has caused men to give it a bad name.

Injustice is more profitable than Justice.

Socrates, after reproaching Thrasymachus with contradicting his own concession, replies by developing the former argument. The fact that a man makes money or gains private advantage by the practice of an art is nothing to the purpose. This is common to all arts. The peculiar nature of every separate art, that in which it differs from the rest, always consists in the best to wal of some special benefit on the person on whom it is practised; the gain accruing, arises from the practice of the art of money-making. Of this in the particular case we are now discussing there is a striking proof. No one, who means to govern honestly, will take office without being paid either in money or honour, except from the fear of being governed by bad men. Thus the assertion that Justice is the advantage of the stronger seems disposed of, but the other assertion that the life of the unjust is better than that of the just man, is far more serious and seems to deserve discussion.

Is Injustice more profitable than Justice?

Thrasymachus at the outset refuses to admit that Justice is Virtue, Injustice Vice. Injustice is good counsel, Justice, noble simplicity. The perfectly unjust are prudent and good. But he is compelled to allow that the unjust man tries to get the better both of just and unjust, while the just man tries to get the better

of the unjust only. But the skilled artist, who is wise and good, endeavours to get the better not of the skilful but of the unskilled; and generally the wise and good do not strive to go beyond those who are like themselves, but only those who are unlike, while the unskilled artist endeavours to get the better both of the skilled and unskilled. Consequently the just man is wise and good, the unjust evil and ignorant, therefore justice is wisdom and virtue.

Injustice is not stronger than Justice.

Nor is Injustice stronger than Justice, for no society of individuals is capable of acting together for any purpose without Justice: and the discord and incapacity for action, which injustice creates in the society, it repeats in the individual. Further, the Gods are just, the just man is their friend, the unjust their enemy.

Injustice is not more profitable than Justice.

Nor is it more profitable, for everything has its own peculiar work, and its own Virtue, which is that which enables it to do that work. The work of the soul is to superintend, to rule, to counsel, and to live. But Justice is the virtue, Injustice the vice of the soul. Consequently the just soul will live well and be happy, the unjust will do the reverse; and as it is more profitable to be happy than to be miserable, it is plain that Justice is more profitable than Injustice.

After all though, our result is somewhat imperfect, for we have not yet discovered what Justice is. And the result of our dialogue thus far is ignorance, for if we do not know what Justice is, we shall hardly know whether it is a virtue and source of happiness or the contrary.

BOOK II.

Which is the better, Justice or Injustice? The Origin of the State and the Education of its Guardians. Myths.

The argument is taken up by Glaucon and Adeimantus who object that Socrates has decided the comparative merits of Justice and Injustice merely by a reference to their consequences.

Arguments of Glaucon. Is Justice in itself better than Injustice?

Socrates, asserts Glaucon, has gained only the semblance of a victory. He has proved that the results and rewards of Justice are better than those of Injustice. But the doubt still remains. Is Justice in itself better than Injustice?

Division of goods

Now goods may be divided into three classes.

1. Those we choose on their own account without regard to their consequences, such as joy and harmless pleasures.

2. Those we choose both on their own account and for their consequences, such as health and intelligence.

3. Those we choose not for their own sakes but for the sake of their consequences, such as exercise, the use of medicine, and money-making.

Of these three classes the second is the highest, and it is in this class that Socrates would place Justice. But this, replies Glaucon, is not at all the common opinion. The generality place Justice in the third class, as something disagreeable in itself but practised for the sake of its results. This opinion is worth discussing, and may be expressed as follows.

Popular view of Justice and Injustice.

Justice is entirely conventional. Mankind finding that the advantages of committing Injustice, which is a

atural good, were more than counterbalanced by the vils of enduring it, resolved to take the mean between he greatest good and the greatest evil. This they call ustice, a neutral state neither good nor bad, which no ne in his senses would adhere to, but from fear of reater ill. Thus men are just because they are not trong enough to be unjust. That this is the case may e easily seen. Let us suppose a just and an unjust ıan to obtain like Gyges the power of rendering themelves invisible, should we not find them both acting in he same way, gratifying their passions in every direction. This affords strong evidence that Injustice is in eality more advantageous than Justice.

Injustice is in reality more profitable than Justice.

But to decide upon the comparative amount of appiness produced by the two, we should take either uality in its highest perfection. Let the unjust man e perfect in his Injustice—let him, while committing rimes of every kind, maintain the reputation of the ighest purity—for no injustice could be greater than his. Let the just man, while perfectly innocent be harged with crimes of every description, for it is the ighest Justice not to seem, but to be just. Let us then onsider which of the two will lead the happier life. he just man will be persecuted, tortured, and at last ut to death. The unjust man will pass a life of the reatest prosperity in this world, and by the sacrifices hich his wealth enables him to offer, will secure a reater share of favour with the deities than even the ıst man himself.

Further, Adeimantus continues, The common exhortations to Justice show, that it is the consequences of ustice that are desirable, not Justice in itself. The estimony of the poets, and their practice too, proves

Justice is followed for its consequences not on its own account.

that Justice is difficult of attainment, and even wh attained does not always secure the favour of the Go Injustice is easy, profitable, and not hard to be aton for.

It is clear then that seeming is everything: object should be to cover an unjust life with the se blance of Justice. Thus securing both profit and good name, and trusting to the expiatory rites for safety in the next world.

These arguments are very forcible, and have gr influence, especially with the young.

Such a conclusion as this can only be avoided b proving that Justice possesses some power in th human soul which renders it, apart from any extern consequences, the greatest good, and Injustice th greatest evil for man. For to recommend Justice fo the sake of its consequences, it is to recommend semblance not a reality.

Reply of Socrates. Justice in the State and in the Individual.

The subject, replies Socrates, is a difficult one, an may best be discussed on a large scale. There i Justice in the individual, and Justice in the state. A examination of the latter will best enable us to under stand the former. To find the origin of Justice in th state we must first look to the origin of the state itsel

The Origin of Society.

Society arises from the wants of man. Each is no self-sufficient, but requires the help of others; food clothing, and shelter are his simplest and earlie requirements. The supply of these involves a divisio of labour: as one man cannot well practice two o three trades—each must do what he can do best fo the benefit of the community. Thus husbandme weavers, shoemakers, and carpenters, together wit the men who prepare their instruments, will form th

implest elements of a State. But no State can well xist without imports, and imports necessitate exports. he exchange of these will require a market-place, ioney, tradesmen, merchants, and hired servants;— he tradesmen being the weak in body who are fit for othing else; the hired servants the stronger and less ıtelligent. The members of this state will lead a life hich though perhaps a little rough, will still be one f health and sobriety.

Progress of Society.

The State in the course of time may be considered s becoming more luxurious, and at the same time ıore complex in its occupations. Painting and mbroidery, Poetry and all its servants, actors, chorusngers, together with material luxuries and those who ıpply them, are gradually introduced. Tutors, nurses, airdressers, and lastly doctors, become necessary. hus the state grows luxurious, and the territory which as large enough for its simplicity will be too small ır its luxury. It will be compelled to take some of s neighbour's land. The increase of luxury will be ıe origin of war, and war, according to our principle f the division of labour, will bring the necessity for rofessional soldiers.

The Origin of War.

Guardians *φύλακες*.

Consequently, we must seek guardians for our State, ətting suitable natures and preparing them by educaon. They must be like thoroughbred dogs—fierce to ıeir foes but gentle to their friends. To secure the ıion of these qualities they must be Philosophers, and ey will never be so, unless they are properly educated.

General education consists of Music and Gymnastics.

What then will the education of our guardians nsist in? We cannot well find a better plan of ucation, than the old-fashioned one of Music for the ind, Gymnastics for the body.

Music includes Literature—false and true.

Music comes first. It includes literature, which is

either false or true; the false, consisting of Myths, i to be studied before the true.

Myths — Their matter.

But care must be taken in the composition of the myths, and poets must be allowed to write only myth of a proper tendency. The works of Homer and Hesiod the great authors of myths, have a bad effect on th young, as they represent the Gods in unworthy situa tions. Now, our poets must be compelled, in thei representations of the Gods, to obey the followin rules. God is to be represented as he is.

The nature of God, good and unchangeable.

God is good and cannot be the author of evil.

With God there is no change of form, for if changed he must be changed either by himself or by another. He cannot be changed by another for he is perfect, and everything, in proportion to its excellence, become less liable to external change. Nor can he be changed by himself, for that would be a change for the worse, and neither God nor man is willingly changed for the worse. Nor can it be said that the Gods, while unchanged in reality, change their appearance, for to do so would be to lie. But *God cannot lie.*

Lies are of two kinds.

For lies are of two kinds. Lies in the soul, or false principles. Lies in words, or false statements. The first are simply and utterly injurious. The latter may in certain cases be useful to deceive an enemy or a madman. But even they cannot be useful to God, for he has no enemies to fear, nor anything to do with madmen. The deity consequently must be regarded as uncompounded and true both in word and deed neither changing himself nor deceiving others, and representations of a contrary kind are to be exclud from the works of the poets, and not used in t education of the young. In this respect Homer a Æschylus are open to censure.

BOOK III.

Poetry, Music, and Gymnastics, their place in Education. Choice of Magistrates.

The myths must stimulate the practice of the various virtues.

Courage.—The courage of our guards must not be lamped by terrible accounts of the infernal regions, or aments for heroes and celebrated men, which are only it for women of inferior character. Moral tendency of myths.

Truth.—Truth must be placed in the first rank of virtues, but falsehood may be occasionally allowed to governors.

Temperance.—Temperance, *i.e.*, obedience to rulers, and self-restraint in sensual indulgences, is of the highest importance. No passages which make Gods or demi-gods examples of intemperance will be allowed in the myths.

Justice.—In their descriptions of human affairs, the myths must not state that Justice is another man's good but the just man's loss. (To allow which, is by the way, a surrender of our original question.)

Next follows the question of style. It is either arrative or imitative. Dramatic poetry is purely nitative. Epic a compound of the two. Their style.

Dramatic poetry must not be admitted into our ate. We do not want our guards to be imitators; a an cannot do many things well. He cannot even act any parts, still less act well on the stage and fulfil the uties of life. Our guards will have no time for imitaon, but should they chance to, they must imitate the ood and not the bad. The Drama excluded.

Music Proper.

Music proper may be divided into words, melody, and rhythm. Words have been discussed.

Melody.—Elegiac and convivial melodies, such as the Lydian and Ionian, are to be rejected. The melodies of valour and obedience, the Dorian and Phrygian, are to be retained, the former for war, the latter for peace. But no musical instruments will be allowed except the lyre and the syrinx—the flute being especially objectionable.

Rhythm.—Rhythm must not be too complex, and both rhythm and melody must follow the words, and must be on the whole such as will express obedience and temperance.

The moral influence of Art.

This rule is indeed applicable to all artistic work. Not in poetry only but in painting, in architecture, in manufactures, seemliness and unseemliness, order and disorder, with which moral virtue and vice are most closely connected, find their expression. It is thus of the highest importance that our poets and artists generally should be compelled to avoid everything base and bad. For there is a subtle contagion in these things. When a man is daily exposed to their influence, his character is corrupted before he knows it. The good influence of noble art is equally subtle in gradually forming the mind to nobleness, and music is particularly important in this respect, as introducing harmony into the soul, curbing the passions, and exciting a love of what is regular and harmonious.

Gymnastics.

It will not be necessary to lay down any special rules about Gymnastics. When we have instructed the mind, we can let it decide for the body. Our guards must keep the ordinary rules of training, without going to that excess which makes an Athlete sleepy and

elicate. Temperance is the great rule, both in gym-astics and music. Without it, a bad state of mind nd body will ensue; and the city will become full of loctors and lawyers, both great signs of corruption.

Lawyers and Doctors.

For there is nothing more disgraceful than a litigious pirit; and with regard to doctors, they are necessary or wounds and epidemics, and should practice as the sons f Œsculapius did before Troy. Patients, with chronic liseases and unsound constitutions, had better die and et rid of their troubles, than live nursing their com-plaints, useless either for philosophy or hard work, and niserable in themselves. The doctor should have the reatest experience in diseases, and if possible have all he diseases which he undertakes to cure, as he does not cure body by body, but body by mind. The judge, who rules mind by mind, should be kept clear of crime, and recognise it by science, not by experience.

The object of Music and Gymnastics.

Music and Gymnastics are not pursued, as is some-imes supposed, one only for the cultivation of the soul, the other for the cultivation of the body. They are both intended for the culture of the soul, Gymnastics to stimulate the spirited, Music the philosophical part. The one practised to the neglect of the other, will make a man either brutal or effeminate.

Rulers.

Our rulers will be selected from the guardians and will be old men, whose only object will be the good of their country. They must be selected at any early age from the most promising part of the population, and exposed to every kind of test, to see whether they can retain the principle that "that is to be done which is best for the State." Those who fail will be rejected. Those who pass the tests will be made our rulers, and will be our guardians properly so called. The younger men

whom we at first called guardians, we now call allies or assistants. (ἐπικούρους.)

To secure the adhesion of the people to these rules it will be necessary to tell them a great lie. That while they seemed to be passing through their education, they were in reality being moulded below the earth. That there is a real difference of nature between the different classes; God having mixed gold in the nature of the guardians, silver in the assistants, brass and iron in the working classes. But there is nothing to prevent a golden guardian from having a silver or a brazen child, or a brazen workman a golden child. The gold is always to rule, the brass and iron to serve, whatever its parentage may be. When we have told them this, we will lead them out like an army, and found our State; being especially particular to make such arrangements for our guardians as will give them neither poverty nor wealth; they alone in the State, are not to be allowed the use of gold or silver in any form, nor even to go under the same roof with it, or to possess any private property.

BOOK IV.

The virtues of the State and of the Individual; Justice the same in each.

To any objection that we do not secure the happiness of our Guardians, our reply will be, that our aim is not the happiness of any particular class, but the good of the whole State. This we imagine to be best secured by each individual performing his work efficiently. The happiness of any class, or of any individual, we leave to nature. Our Guardians have their trade like other artizans; to do it well, they must have neither poverty nor riches. From these too we must guard the general body of our people, as the one produces meanness, the other pride. Happiness of the Guardians

In war our State will do very well; it will have no money to fight for, and will gain allies by giving up its share of the booty. War.

The size of our State will be limited only by its unity; nor is this a matter of great importance. Every one must practise his own natural calling, and be one with himself. Education is the principal point,—to preserve music and gymnastics unaltered, and especially music, for alterations in music are always momentous. Therefore we must make music our safeguard, and we may then leave our citizens to discover for themselves a vast number of minor rules. Extent of the State.

The greatest, and noblest, of our institutions, those connected with the religious observances, we will leave to the decision of Apollo at Delphi. Religion.

Our State is founded; but where is Justice? We may find it in this way. Our State is perfectly good; Where is Justice?

it will therefore possess Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. If we discover the first three, the remainder will be Justice.

Wisdom in the State. (σοφία)

Wisdom in the State is good counsel, the science which consults for the good of the whole. This science belongs exclusively to the ruling class. Consequently the State is wise by the wisdom of its Guardians.

Courage. (ἀνδρεία)

A State is called courageous from the valour of its soldiers. Courage is the maintenance of right principles, amid the distractions, not merely of bodily perils, but of pleasure, pain, and appetite. It arises not from mere brute strength, but from education and a regard for law.

Temperance. (σωφροσύνη)

Temperance is a harmony and agreement extending through all classes in the State. As a man is said to be temperate, to be superior to himself, when the better part of his soul rules the worse, so a State is temperate when the better classes rule the inferior; but the quality of Temperance itself belongs both to the governing and the governed classes.

Justice. (δικαιοσύνη)

The remainder, Justice, is what we mentioned before when we were founding our State, as necessary for every one to practice, namely to do that for which his nature best fitted him. In a certain sense Justice may be said to be the attending to one's own business and not interfering with that of others. In a more general sense the remaining virtue, after wisdom, courage, and temperance are discovered, would be that which enables the three to take out in a State and preserves them there. This must be Justice, which is beyond others the virtue of the State. For the end of all courts of Justice is that each should have his own, neither taking the property of other people nor being deprived of what is his. Thus Justice would be the having and

doing (ἕξις καὶ πρᾶξις) of what belongs to us and is our own. It is this that provides the division of labour, and keeps each class in the State in its own proper place and at its own work. Injustice is the reverse of this, and is the greatest injury to the State. The State is just when every class in it performs its proper work. We must not yet put this positively, but if we find that when applied to the individual it then constitutes Justice we must consider that we have discovered the virtue required.

Justice in the individual will be similar to Justice in the State, for the State is in every respect an exact copy of the Individual. Justice in the Individual.

We shall, therefore, find the same divisions, as well as the same virtues and vices, in the Soul, as we find in the State. It is difficult to show this by our present plan of argument, but it may be done to a certain extent. Division of the Soul.

Justice in the State consisted in the proper performance of work by each of the three classes. That there is a similar threefold division in the Soul may thus be proved. The same thing cannot do or suffer opposites at the same time, with the same part, and in the same relation. Now we see that men are often at the same time internally urged to drink and restrained from drinking, consequently we may infer that the feeling which urges them to drink is distinct and separate from that which restrains them from drinking. (We must not confound the simple feeling with its accidents; the simple desire for drink may have added to it a desire for hot, cold, much, or little drink.) We thus get a twofold division of the Soul.

1. The Appetitive part. (ἐπιθυμητικόν μερός.)
2. The Reasoning part (λογιστικὸν μερός,) which restrains appetite. To these we may add,

3. The Spirited part (*θυμοειδὲς μερός*,) which assists reason against *ἐπιθυμία*, and rouses resentment against Injustice.

As therefore in the State we have the threefold division of guardians, assistants, and workmen, and as Justice in the State consists in the right performance of its work by each of these classes; so in the Individual we have the Reasoning, the Spirited, and Appetitive divisions of the soul. The Individual is wise by the exercise of the reasoning, brave by the exercise of the spirited part; temperate by observing a due relation between the reasoning and the appetitive parts; while *Justice in the Individual* is an internal principle—the right and harmonious working of all these parts, the performance of their proper business in guiding the life of man—a principle not consisting, but exhibiting itself, in correctness of action.

Injustice.

Injustice is of course the opposite of this—the disorder and inharmonious working of the soul.

Justice is better than Injustice.

Thus virtue is the health of the soul, vice its disease and deformity. Consequently it becomes unnecessary to discuss the question whether Justice is expedient, independent of external consequences; for as no external prosperity can make life tolerable without health, so no amount of indulgence can compensate for the loss of a healthy state of soul.

Forms of Virtue and Vice.

Now there is one form of virtue but countless forms of vice. Of these four are most conspicuous, corresponding to four bad forms of government.

The perfect form which we have described may be called according to circumstances either a Monarchy or an Aristocracy. A Monarchy if it is ruled by one, an Aristocracy if ruled by many.

BOOK V.

The position of Women and Children. The State must be governed by Philosophers: what is a Philosopher?

Socrates was proceeding to describe the four main deviations from a right form of government, when he is stopped by his friends, who demand a fuller explanation of the position of women and children in the state: after some hesitation he proceeds.

The position of Women and Children in the State.

Woman is the weaker man; for both sexes have the same capacities for the performance of the active duties of life, the same in kind, though existing in a higher degree in the male. This we may see from the analogy of brutes. Our guardians were to be like watchdogs, but male and female watchdogs are equally useful. The daughters of our guardians will therefore receive the same education, both in music and gymnastics, with the rest of the people; and mockers, if there be any, must be silenced by the rigour of the law. For there is nothing really ludicrous but what is bad and foolish.

But we may be answered with an objection out of our own mouths. We laid down as a preliminary in the foundation of our State, that each must employ himself in the one business in accordance with his nature. The natures of male and female are different, therefore their business must be different. But the word "different" is ambiguous, and may imply either a great, or a slight diversity. The difference between men and women seems to be merely the sexual distinction; in all the pursuits of life their capacities for learning and action are pretty nearly the same. We

shall therefore employ women in every profession, and the wives of our guardians will do the same work, and receive the same education, as their husbands.

Community of Wives and Children.

The wives and children of our guardians must be held in common. This, whether it be possible or not, would at any rate be expedient, as it would enable us to unite the healthiest and handsomest couples.

Marriage

Marriages are to be considered sacred, and will be in the hands of the authorities, who are to unite couples by lot, taking care always to manage so that the best are paired. The age for legitimate procreation will be from 20 to 40 in a woman, 30 to 55 in a man. Public nurseries will be established, and children must consider those their parents to whom they are born between the seventh and tenth month after marriage. A man may marry any one but his daughter or granddaughter, his mother or grandmother; a woman any one except her father or son, grandfather or grandson. Brothers and sisters may marry, if the lot so fall out, and the Delphic oracle allow it.

This community of wives and children will be of the greatest advantage to the State; for the highest good to a state is unity; and unity is best attained by a perfect community of interests, like that community of sensation existing between the members of the body. This comes to pass in a State when the greatest number unite in calling the same thing "mine." Nor could it in anywise be more easily attained, than by that intimate family relationship which would be the result of a community of wives and children. A community of property will unite in producing the same effect. There will then be no law suits, and very little quarrelling. Our guardians will be free from the incumbrances

of wealth, and from all the vulgar vices and inconveniences which poverty brings with it. They will lead a life happier than that of the Olympic victors, and will receive honours after death. Thus all doubt as to the happiness of the guardians has vanished; they will be very happy; but their happiness will be conditional on their own prudence and moderation.

War. Men and women will march to battle together, and will be accompanied by their children on horseback, when the expeditions are not very dangerous. Cowardice will be punished by degradation to a lower rank in society. Captives will be made a present of to the enemy. Valour will be rewarded in every way, specially by giving the distinguished soldier an absolute claim to select whom he pleases as his wife. Those who die gloriously in battle, or of old age after a very distinguished life, will be honoured with a public funeral and be worshipped as Demigods. In carrying on war we shall not spoil the bodies of the slain, or carry trophies into the temples of the Gods. We shall, besides, draw a distinction between Greeks and Barbarians. All Greeks are naturally friends, and a war between Greeks is merely a quarrel (*στάσις*). In war with Greeks we must neither make slaves nor burn houses, but be satisfied with destroying the yearly produce of the land; for we must beware lest the Greek race be subdued by the Barbarians. With these latter we may carry on war as the Greeks do at present among themselves.

Is such a State possible, and how? But is such a form of Government as we have been describing, possible? That is not an essential part of our argument, but still it may be considered. Such a state will only be founded when philosophers are kings,

or kings philosophers. This may seem strange, but it is nevertheless true. In order to prove the truth of it we must first show what we mean by the term philosopher.

The Philosophic character; its formation, and relation to the State.

The Philosophic character.

The philosopher is a lover, and like other lovers loves the whole of his object, wisdom. The desire of acquiring knowledge must be distinguished from that which occupies the seekers of frivolous or mean information, the spectators at theatres and professors of small arts. The distinction is this. All qualities exist under two forms, they have their own single absolute existence, (*αὐτὸ ἕκαστον*,) they have also a phenomenal multiplex existence in union with different systems of matter. Mankind desire the beautiful (*τὸ καλὸν*,) in its various phenomenal manifestations of music, poetry, &c.

Science.

The philosopher desires the absolute *καλὸν*. To the knowledge of the philosopher, which is concerned with real existence, (*τὸ ὄν*) we may give the name of knowledge proper, or science. (*γνῶσις, γνώμη*, or, *ἐπιστήμη*.)

Opinion.

The knowledge of the generality of men is opinion (*δόξα*); concerned with all that hovers between existence and non-existence, the fluctuating and apparent world of sense, in which all qualities are relative and consequently mutable. They are consequently lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom. Last in the scale comes—

Ignorance.

Ignorance—(*ἄγνοια*) which is concerned with the non-existent.

The majority of the world do not believe in the bsolute existence of the beautiful, for instance, but care nly for its phenomenal manifestations. The philoso- her desires to reach the absolute or abstract beauty nd goodness. To this knowledge we give the name of cience, as it is correlative to existence. Ignorance is orrelative to non-existence. But between existence nd non-existence there is something intermediate that artakes of both, to this opinion is correlative. For he faculties are distinguished by their functions and rovinces; Science is a faculty and its province is xistence ; opinion is also a faculty, its province is the egion between existence and non-existence. That here is such a province is evident, for of all phenomenal eauty there is nothing that may not in another re- ation appear base, or of just that may not appear njust, even as things that are small in one re- ation are large in another, or light in comparison ith one thing are heavy in comparison with another, .e. they have as much claim to one title as the ther, and so hover between existence and non- xistence. This is the subject matter of opinion, o which the notions current generally among men bout beauty, justice, &c., belong. They love sounds nd forms but will not hear of the existence of abstract eauty, consequently we shall call them lovers of pinion rather than philosophers, and restrict the title f philosopher to those who seek after the absolute *αὐτὸ ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν*).

BOOK VI.

The relation of Philosophers to the State; and of their studies to education.

Philosophers are the best rulers.

Such then are philosophers. Now it is evidently our business to entrust the government of the State to those who are best fitted to conduct it. The majority of mankind, who know nothing about real existence, are little better than blind men. The philosopher, who studies real existence, is clearly the best ruler, if he possesses the other practical qualifications. Does he possess these?

The Virtues of the Philosopher.

The philosopher is not merely a lover of real existence. He has besides in his character Truth, Temperance, Liberality, Magnanimity, Courage, Justice, Aptness to learn, and Elegance of mind.

He has *Truth*, which is most intimately connected with wisdom.

Temperance—For the pleasures of the mind will take away all desire for those of the body.

Liberality and freedom from covetousness—For he naturally will not care about money.

Magnanimity—For littleness of mind is entirely opposed to the greatness of his subject.

Courage—He well knows how little life is worth, and will not fear death.

Justice and Placability as a consequence of the former virtues, together with the intellectual excellences of

Aptness to learn, which is absolutely necessary for the acquisition of a knowledge of philosophy.

Memory, and general elegance of mind, as the result of his other qualities.

Not even Momus could blame a man who had so many virtues. Will not such a man be the right person to direct the State?

Objection of Adeimantus.

This conclusion, as a matter of argument, Adeimantus remarks, is very ingenious. But arguing with Socrates is like playing with a skilful draught-player, you are pushed from one position to another till you have not a move left. It is difficult to find a flaw in the above chain of reasoning; but when we look to the facts of the case, to actual life, we find that philosophers are by no means the perfect beings here represented. On the contrary, they are either morally depraved, or utterly useless for practical life.

All this, replies Socrates, is quite true. But the fault does not lie with philosophers but with the State. The State at present is like a ship's company in mutiny, who have driven the pilot from the helm, and undertaken to manage the vessel themselves.

The uselessness of Philosophers.

Philosophers are useless, partly because no one will employ them, partly from the unworthy character of many who profess philosophy. The philosophic character does indeed embrace all excellences; but it is liable to be spoilt, because its elements to a certain extent tend to destroy one another; and its very strength and beauty render it more pernicious when depraved.

The blame of the present state of things does not so much belong to the much-abused sophists, as to the people whose opinions they represent. Everything is now referred to the decision of the multitude, which men are taught to manage as they would a huge wild

animal, without any consideration of the real nature of right and wrong. The best men are dragged away from philosophy into political life. Philosophy itself is occupied by the worthless and contemptible, who take it up, lured by its great name, for the sake of notoriety; while the small number who engage worthily in philosophical studies think themselves only too happy, if they can keep out of the dust and turmoil of public life.

This would not be the case in a rightly constituted State. Such an one in fact as we have been describing, with the additional provision that the guardians have a thorough philosophic education. To remove these hindrances to philosophy, which are the result of present untoward circumstances, we must make a change, for no State, as now constituted, is worthy of the philosophic character. Nor shall we ever have either a perfect State or a perfect man until either philosophers are entrusted with the government, or some King or King's son turns philosopher.

To resume the subject.

Philosophical Education of the Guardians.

Our guardians, as we said before, must be tested in pleasure and pain. Those who pass successfully through the tests must be regarded as gold tried in the furnace, must be made rulers, and honoured both in life and in death. But they must also be philosophers; and they will be very few in number, for intellectual keenness is seldom found united with steadiness and endurance, and these must be united to form the philosopher. The last test will be whether they are able to bear the highest object of knowledge. This is the *idea of good*, from which justice and all other good qualities derive their usefulness. But what is the good? To the

majority of men, pleasure seems the good; to the more refined, intellect. But even those who place the good in intellect are compelled to acknowledge that it is intellect of the good; while those who place it in pleasure allow that some pleasures are bad. The guardians of the state, if they are to be worth anything, must have a more accurate knowledge; they must know with scientific certainty what is the good.

The idea of good.

To explain completely the idea of Good is beyond our present purpose; we must be satisfied with a description of the offspring of the good. This we may gain in the following way. Let us first then call to mind the distinction between the visible many and the intelligible one. Absolute beauty and goodness can be perceived only by the intellect, not by the sight. But of the senses, sight is most elaborately equipped, for it is the only sense which requires a medium between itself and the object on which it is exercised. The medium is light, which comes from the sun, and without which nothing can be seen in its true colours. The sun in the visible world corresponds to the idea of good in the intellectual.

Now just as in the visible world the sun is the source, not merely of light, but of birth, growth, and nutriment; so, in the intellectual, the good is the source, not merely of knowledge, but of truth and existence to the intelligible; the good itself not being existence, but stretching far beyond existence in dignity and power.* A representation may thus be given of the

* The series may thus be arranged :—

Sun ..... Good.	Eye ..... Intellect.
Light ..... Truth.	Sight ..... Knowledge.
Nutriment..... Being.	

distinction between the visible and the intelligible. Suppose a line unequally divided, and the segment afterwards divided equally. Then one segment may be taken to represent the visible, the other the intellectual world; and their divisions will represent

In segment 1, The Visible.	1. Visible shadows.
	2. Visible substances.
In segment 2, The Intelligible.	1. Abstractions generalized from objects of sense.
	2. Ideas prior to the objects of sense.

The segment of the Intelligible.

In the first division of the segment of the intelligible, the mind proceeds from hypotheses, not to the principle but to the end, using the hypotheses as principles. In the second, the mind argues from the hypotheses to an unhypothetical end. In the first half, the proceedings of the mind are analogous to those of mathematical reasoners, who make a visible square the subject of their reasonings, when in reality they are reasoning about the absolute square. The faculty concerned in this process is understanding (*διάνοια*).

In the second division, the mind also starts from hypotheses, but employs them, not as principles, but in their proper capacity, as steps and starting points, and by the power of dialectic, reasons up to pure unhypothetical being. For this process, intellect (*νοησις*) is the faculty.

There are thus four faculties—two for each segment, conjecture (*εἰκασία*), and belief (*πίστις*), for the visible; understanding (*διάνοια*), and intellect (*νόησις*) for the intelligible.

BOOK VII.

The Education of the Philosopher.

Simile of the cave.

The condition of mankind with regard to education, nd the want of it, may be compared to that of men ıut up from childhood in a cave, chained neck and gs, unable to turn their heads, seeing nothing but the ıadow of things moved before a light, and hearing othing but the voices of the men who moved them. ı such a case they would naturally consider the ıadows as realities, would give them names as such, ıd would imagine that the shadows uttered the words ally spoken by their carriers. Supposing one of these isoners were to be released, and brought to the light ıd the actual world, he would be confused and nazed, and would think his former shadows truer than e actual realities. Still more, if he were made to ok at the sun itself, the darkness of the cave would em more distinct than that. Time and practice would ; required to enable him to see things clearly. He ›uld begin by looking at the shadows of men and ings, then at their reflection in water, lastly, at the ings themselves; next he would look at the nightly y, the moon and the stars; last of all at the light of e sun. He would then be able to conclude that the n was the author of the seasons and years, and in a ain way the cause of all earthly things. Having ined to this knowledge, he would rejoice at his ase from the cave, and would consider the honours distinctions of his late fellow prisoners as worth hing. But were he compelled to return to the cave,

he would at first be as a blind man. It would be a long time before he would be able to see in its darkness; in the meantime, he would be laughed at, as though he had lost the use of his eyes, and, if he tried to lead his companions to the light, would be in danger of his life.

This simile may show us the relation in which the world stands towards Philosophers, and Philosophers towards the world. It should check the ridicule with which Philosophers are often treated, for it explains the cause of their apparently strange conduct. Their eyes are dazzled by coming out of light into darkness.

With the leading up of the mind from darkness to light philosophical education is naturally connected.

Philosophical education.

On this subject we must start with doctrines different from those held by the majority of men. The common theory is, that there is no innate knowledge in the soul, but that all is put in by the teacher, as sight might be given to a blind man. Our doctrine will be, that intellect, or science, is inherent in the soul, and that all the teacher has to do is to give it a proper direction; just as a man might possess the power of sight, and yet require to be brought from darkness to light in order to exercise it. The other virtues of the soul are, much like those of the body, not innate, but produced by practice and habit; but intellect is of a diviner nature, and never loses its power, though it becomes useful only under proper training; for even in depraved men, the powers of the soul are clear and keen enough, only standing in need of proper guidance. We must, therefore, have such a system of education as will, from the earliest age, turn the mind away from the sensual clogs of earthly life, to the contemplation of actual truth. But we shall not let our educated men spend

heir lives in the study of Philosophy, much as they ight wish it. They are intended to be a bond of the tate, and will have to return to their fellow prisoners a the cave. For our object is the happiness, not of a lass, but of the whole people. And we shall tell our hilosophers that they are not in the same position as hose, who, in other States, cultivate Philosophy of their wn accord. They have been educated by the State, nd must make some return for their education. They ill be the best of all governors, because they will take ffice unwillingly, and there will consequently be no truggles for power amongst them.

We want, therefore, such a system of education as ill bring our men from darkness to light. At the me time, as the men are to be athletes of war, it ust be an education which will be useful to soldiers. or these two purposes music and gymnastics will not o. For gymnastic is evidently concerned with growth nd decay; namely, the growth and decay of the uman body: and music gives us harmony, not science; id is not a means of education for the attainment of ie good. But

Arithmetic is of universal application in the arts and pecially in the art of war. It is thus necessary for a ldier, and has also a philosophical value, in the follow- g way. Those objects of sense which do not present any ntradiction to thought, are not provocative of any pro- ss of mental activity. For instance, a finger taken by elf does not stimulate the mind of the generality to en- ire what it really is; they acquiesce in the information forded by the senses. But the moment you look upon in another light, as large or small, rough or smooth, rd or soft, a contradiction arises, for the same thing

Arithmetic.

is both hard and soft according to the relation in whic
it is viewed, and yet no one imagines that these contra
dictory qualities are the same. The mind is thu
impelled to enquire what such qualities really are, an
enquiries, such as these, are calculated to stimulate th
understanding and rouse the intellect. Arithmetic is
study which gives rise to similar enquiries, for it ca
our attention to the apparent contradiction betwee
the one and the many; as it shows us how the sam
thing may, at the same time, be considered to be bot
one and many. Thus, Arithmetic must be studied, no
with a mercantile object, but as a means of attaining t
the real nature of numbers. Abstract, not concret
numbers, will be the subject of our study; and we shal
then have a pursuit calculated to lead the mind to the
contemplation of truth, necessary to soldiers for th
disposition of the army and useful to the philosopher a
leading to real existence, and generally advantageous
on account of its difficulty, and the sharpness of intel
lect which it produces.

Geometry

Geometry is obviously useful in war, i.e., with re
gard to the formation of encampments and th
manœuvering of troops. For this, however, a smal
amount of geometrical knowledge is sufficient. Studie
more extensively, it may be considered as drawing th
mind from birth and decay and leading to the knowledg
of real existence, for geometry is the knowledge of th
ever-existing.

Geometry of Solids.

The Geometry of Solids is a preliminary
Astronomy, for Astronomy is the study of solids in m
tion, the geometry of solids, the study of solids at re
It is a pursuit of the greatest elegance, but does n
hold its proper place in education, being neglected

the majority of men, and studied by those who do take it up without any knowledge of its real utility.

Astronomy is useful, not as a lifting up of the eye, but as a lifting up of the soul. The heavenly bodies are but as diagrams, by means of which we gain an insight into the principles of real motion. For while we acknowledge that the celestial bodies are the fairest and noblest of visible works, we cannot allow that they are real existences and real motion, or capable of being contemplated by intellect. Astronomy.

Harmonics are related to Astronomy: both are concerned with motion. Astronomy with visible, Harmonics with audible motion. The same mistake exists in the common study of Harmonics as is found in the study of Astronomy. They are pursued not as a means of attaining to the truth, but as though they contained absolute truth in themselves. Harmonics.

Finally, Dialectic is the completion of all these sciences; long and laborious as they may seem, they are all but the prelude to the study of the real and intelligible. This can only be attained by Dialectic, which is to the mind what sight is to the body; for just as in the world of phenomenal existence, sight looks first at animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun, the end of the visible,—so in the intellectual, dialectic proceeds through the survey of the intelligible until it arrives at the absolute good—the end of the intelligible. Thus the bringing up of the prisoners from the cave is an image of the turning of the mind from the contemplation of phenomenal to that of real existence. Dialectic.

Dialectic differs from the other arts in this respect. The majority of the arts are concerned with opinions

and desires, birth and combination. The higher art such as Geometry, Harmonics, &c., which to some exter lay hold of real existence, yet have only a glimpse of i because they assume as first principles hypotheses which they are unable to give any account. Bein ignorant of the principle, their end and their whol chain of reasoning is good for nothing. Dialectic goe straight to the principle itself, and gradually raises th soul by the aid of the subsidiary arts; these arts ar popularly called sciences, a better name for them woul be understanding (*διάνοια*). Our nomenclature wi then be as follows:—

1. Science or Dialectic (*ἐπιστήμη*);
2. Understanding (*διάνοια*), or the subsidiary and preliminary arts.

} Constitute Intellect (*νόησις*), which is concerne with real existence.

1. Belief (*πίστις*);
2. Conjecture (*εἰκασία*).

} Constitute opinion (*δόξα*) which is concerned with the apparent and changing.

The great test of scientific ability will be, the power o separating the idea of good from everything with which it may be mixed up, and following it, at all hazards, until it be firmly grasped.

Selection and Education of Governors.

The last question is the selection and education o our governors. It will be in this wise. We must pick out while they are young, men sound in body and mind, not too fond of bodily to the neglect of intellectual work, possessing good memories and lovers o truth. A course of education, liberal and not com-

pulsory, must be commenced by these when quite young (a point of the highest importance), on the following plan :—

System of Education.

There will be a compulsory education, open to all, in Music, from the earliest age until about 17½. In Gymnastics from 17½ until 20. In the meantime the most promising students are to have the preliminary sciences put before them generally. At 20 years of age, those who have most distinguished themselves in their previous studies, are to receive a training in comparative science from 20 to 30 : those preliminary sciences which they had before studied separately being now brought together in one view. At 30 they are to commence the study of Dialectic. But here great care must be taken not to make them lawless : for a young man on his first introduction to the study of Dialectic is like a child, who, when grown to man's estate discovers that those whom he supposed his parents are not really so. He is tempted to neglect his so-called parents and to throw himself into the hands of flatterers. So the student, finding that the principles of right and wrong in which he had been educated will not stand the test of Dialectic, is tempted to resign himself to the guidance of flattering appetites. A certain maturity of age, therefore, must be attained before Dialectic can be safely studied. Dialectic and Gymnastics will occupy the time from 30 to 35. To this will succeed active Political life from 35 to 50. At 50 active Political life will cease. Philosophy and occasional Political duty will occupy the time until death. This plan of education is adapted for male and female alike. Our whole system though difficult to realize is not impossible, but possible only in this way, if

Philosophers become rulers, or some of the existin
rulers should rearrange their State, by removing all wh
are above ten years of age and educating the remainde
on proper principles. This then is the conclusion o
our discussion with regard to the State and th
individual, we have shown what they ought to be.

BOOK VIII.

Deviations from the right standard, in the State, and in the Individual. Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, Tyranny.

Deviations from the perfect constitution.

These then are the institutions, the education, and the government of a perfect State. The deviations from the perfect form are now to be considered. They will fall into four classes. 1. The Laconian or Cretan (Timocracy). 2. Oligarchy. 3. Dēmocracy. 4. Tyranny. As these variations in political constitution spring only from the variations in human nature, there will consequently be an individual who will correspond to each form of government. Our plan is to look at the individual in the State; by this means we shall be able to see whether justice or injustice produces most happiness.

Origin of the deviations.

The deviations will arise from the corruption of our Aristocratia. When the fatal period of decay, to which all created things are liable, shall have arrived, in accordance with the geometrical cycle of the human race, the rulers will make marriages at an unlucky time. The offspring of these marriages, when they come to be rulers themselves, will neglect first Music, then Gymnastics. Imperfectly educated magistrates will fail in separating the gold and silver from the iron and the brass. Inequality and irregularity, and their consequences, enmities and war between the two parties, will ensue. In the end both will agree to appropriate the land and houses, and enslave the people whom they before protected. Our State will then become

Timocracy.

A Timocracy.—A kind of mean between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, resembling the former in its separation of the warrior class, and its devotion to Gymnastics; the latter in its love of wealth; and possessing a peculiar element of its own in the preponderance of the spirited principle, exhibiting itself in party spirit and a love of honours.

The Timocratic man.

The Timocratic man is similar in character; fierce and ambitious, fond of music but not skilled in it, submissive to his superiors, but stern to his inferiors. He is generally the son of a quiet and easy going father, and is roused to ambition by hearing his mother and servants blame his father's remissness.

Oligarchy.

To Timocracy succeeds Oligarchy, a political system in which the wealthy rule, and the poor have no share in the Government. The love of wealth in a Timocracy leads to its continued acquisition and heightened estimation, until its possession is at last made the sole qualification for political power. And this is bad; for that wealth does not imply wisdom the common practice of mankind abundantly proves. No one would think of choosing a pilot in accordance with a property qualification. An Oligarchical State consists in reality of two nations—the rich and the poor. It cannot engage in war, for it fears to arm the people; and it neglects that division of occupations which we decided to be so important. The accumulation of wealth in a few hands implies and necessitates the existence of a large pauperised class; a set of drones in the hive, who are unfortunately anything but stingless; for crime is the invariable accompaniment of poverty, and extreme poverty will always create a large criminal class, who are only to be kept in subjection by actual force.

The Oligarchic man is the son of the Timocratic, who having seen his father disgraced and ruined in the pursuit of honours, gives himself up to the gaining of money. He pushes from their places in his mind the reasoning and the spirited principles, and gives himself up entirely to the consideration of money matters. The internal constitution of his mind exactly corresponds to a political Oligarchy. The Oligarchic Man.

Democracy arises out of Oligarchy. The ruling body in the Oligarchy, in order that they may enrich themselves by lending money at high interest, allow young men to run a course of extravagance. These young men, stripped of their property and civil rights, form a powerful and dangerous class. The rich, devoting themselves to nothing but money-making, become weak and effeminate. The poor, at last discovering their own power, kill, expel, or subdue the rich, throw open the magistracies to all, and distribute offices by lot. This Democracy is a very pleasant sort of government, for it lets a man say and do exactly as he pleases. This, however, does not quite agree with our notions on the subject. Democracy.

The Democratic man is the son of the Oligarchic, who, having been compelled in youth, by a severe and miserly father, to bridle his unnecessary appetites, on getting older gives himself up to their gratification. The Democratic Man.

(The necessary appetites are those which we cannot get rid of, the gratification of which does us service. Necessary and Unnecessary Appetites.

The unnecessary appetites are those which can be got rid of by practice, the gratification of which does us either no good or positive harm. For instance. The desire of eating, so far as health requires, would

be a necessary, gluttony, or the desire of excessiv eating, would be an unnecessary appetite.)

The higher part of his nature is thus attacked an overcome by the lowest desires. Expelled, perhaps at first, these return in greater force, and besiege th unguarded Acropolis of the soul. The result is a com plete reversal of the moral signification of language Modesty is called folly, temperance unmanliness moderation meanness, while insolence takes the nam of good breeding, anarchy of freedom, extravagance of magnificence, shamelessness of courage. Whe the heat of youthful passion has cooled down, th Democratic man often readmits into his soul some o the feelings he had banished. He then gives himsel up to all pleasures alike, adhering to each as i chances to obtain the control over him, sometime temperate, sometimes intemperate, now a philosopher now a soldier, becoming in fact an Isonomic man.

Tyranny.

Tyranny arises from Democracy, in the same way a Democracy arose from Oligarchy,—from an insatiabl desire for the proposed good. An excessive desire fo wealth destroyed Oligarchy, an excessive desire fo liberty destroys Democracy. The people gradually become disorderly, and unwilling to obey any authority The drones call in the aid of the Demus to enabl them to plunder the rich: the rich defend themselves The Demus then choose a champion, and furnish hi with a body guard. He overcomes the wealthy, an proclaims a remission of debt and a redivision of th land; but at last, compelled to a certain extent by th difficulties of his position, subverts the constitution, an establishes himself as absolute governor. Until he i secure of his place the tyrant conducts himself wit

moderation. But then his conduct changes; he stirs up wars that the people may require a leader, these wars also giving him an opportunity of getting rid of refractory subjects. He is compelled to remove all the best men from his kingdom, and to rely upon the support of foreign mercenaries and emancipated slaves. An excellent institution is this of tyranny, and wise must the tragedians and especially Euripides be who have praised it, and said that tyrants are wise by associating with the wise. The writers of tragedies must excuse us if we do not admit them into our State. And the people who adopt this form of government fly from the smoke of free government into the fire of despotism.

To maintain his band of mercenaries the tyrant will first sell the sacred property, and, when that is exhausted, will make the people maintain him. If it refuse, like a father who might object to maintain a grown up son, he will first strip it of its arms, and then force it to yield. A tyrant, in fact, is little better than a Parricide.

BOOK IX.

The Tyrannical Man; his happiness. Justice as an internal principle in itself better than Injustice.

The Tyrannical Man.

The formation and character of the Tyrannical man, has now to be explained. But, first, a brief digression as to the appetites. The extent to which the appetitive is governed by the reasoning part of the soul, may be tested by the character of a man's dreams. For it is in sleep that the wild and brutal part of a man is most active and free from control. Hence the dreams of the man who does and the man who does not govern his appetites, will be very different.

To resume, The Democratical man, as we stated, was brought up by a frugal father, led by the influence of dissolute companions to gratify his passions, yet still not so bad as his corruptors, but keeping a kind of mean between extravagance and parsimony. We may imagine the son of this man plunging into every kind of extravagance, with the assistance and encouragement of his father, and at last falling under the dominion of some powerful leading passion of love, which puts itself at the head of all his idle desires, and uses them as its body guard. The man now plunges into every kind of debauchery, and his own property being soon wasted, he is obliged to borrow, in order to support his body-guard of passions. When this resource fails, he applies to his parents, and if they refuse to assist him, he first cheats, and then openly ill-uses them. When their means are exhausted, he is compelled to resort to open

Such is the Tyrannical man. Men of this

character, when they are in a minority in a State, form the criminal class. When they are the majority, they establish a tyranny, setting up as tyrant the man who has most of the tyrant in his soul, and who thus attains the lowest depth of baseness when he tyrannises, not only over himself, but over others.

Threefold proof that the Just life is better than the unjust.

1. The Tyrannical and unjust man is not happy.

But how about the happiness of the Tyrannical man? Is he not also most miserable? Now the State is a picture of the individual. Both in the tyrannical State and the tyrannical soul, the nobler is held in subjection by the baser part; neither can do what it wishes; both are penurious and insatiable, and both very wretched, but the latter most especially so, when its possessor does not lead a private life, but becomes an actual tyrant. For the tyrant is like a slaveholder, deprived of the protection of Society; he is shut up in a prison which he dares not to leave. While he appears to have power, he is in reality a bondsman. While he appears rich, he is really poor; full of insatiable desires, of fears and torments of every kind, and becoming still more so the longer he retains his power. We may then arrange in order, with regard to their respective degrees of happiness, the Regal, the Timocratic, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, and the Tyrannical man; the regal being the happiest, the tyrannical the most miserable. And from this again it follows that the Just man is happier than the Unjust.

2. The pleasure of the Philosophic life is the greatest.

But this question as to the comparative happiness of different lives admits of a further solution. There are three divisions of the soul, the Reasoning, the Appetitive, and the Spirited; each of these has its pleasure. In this point of view, these divisions of the soul may be called the Philosophic, the Philoneikic, and the

Philokerdic, as the pleasure of each lies in Truth, Honour, and Gain. There are also three classes of men who apply themselves to these three pursuits, each thinking that his own life is the pleasantest. Of the comparative pleasantness of these lives, the Philosopher is the only judge. For the criterion of Truth is Experience, Wisdom, and Reason. The Philosopher has most experience, the two other classes knowing only their own pleasure, while the Philosopher knows all three. He has wisdom with experience. And reasoning being his own peculiar instrument—he is of course a better master of this criterion than the Honour-lover or Gain-lover. In pronouncing therefore his own pleasure to be sweetest, he is delivering a judgment which he is competent to pronounce; next to his own, he will place second that of the Honour-lover last, that of the Gain-lover.

3. Intellect is the only real source of Pleasure.

This conclusion may be pushed a step further. An examination of the nature of pleasure will show that not only has intellect the highest, but it has the only real pleasure. Pleasure is the opposite to pain. There is also a middle state between the two called Repose. To men who are in pain, the change from pain to repose is pleasant, to men who are in pleasure the change is painful. But repose itself is neither pleasure nor pain; it merely appears so when compared with the two others. For, 1. Pleasure and pain are motion (*κίνησις*) in the soul. 2. To make pleasure repose would be to make it a mere release from pain. But this definition would not fit even the bodily pleasures; for though some of these are merely a release from pain, others, such as the pleasures of smell, are not. Repose occupies, with respect to pleasure and

pain, the same relation which the middle in space has to the up and the down; to men who are rising from below, the middle seems up; to men who are sinking from above, the middle seems down. The middle state, between pain and pleasure, is the highest that any but the Philosopher can attain. For if pleasure be considered to consist in the being filled with things suitable to one's nature, it is evident that the reality of the pleasure will be proportionate to the extent in which the recipient, and the things received, partake of real existence. But the soul partakes of real existence more than the body; and intelligence, with which ignorance, the emptiness of the soul is satisfied, more than food, with which the hunger of the body. Thus those who, being inexperienced in intellect and virtue, find their pleasure merely in bodily indulgences, oscillate for ever between pain, (the down,) and repose, (the middle,) never attaining to true pleasures, or the true up.

Justice as an Internal Principle is more profitable than Injustice.

Finally, to return once more to our original question, the advantage which Justice possesses over Injustice may be shown by this illustration.

A many-headed beast, a lion and a man enclosed in a single human body, may be taken to represent man with his threefold division, into the appetitive, the spirited, and reasoning parts. To practice Injustice is to pamper the many-headed beast, and to starve the man. To practice Justice is to make strong the inner man, and with the assistance of the lion to control the many-headed beast. There can therefore be no advantage in committing unjust actions, for to do so is to enslave the nobler to the baser part of the soul. Intemperance, self-will, ill-temper, luxury, effeminate-

ness, and meanness, are all blameworthy, as they disturb the internal harmony and proper government of these three parts of the soul of man.

Men take their rank in life according to the balance of these internal principles. Those must fall into an inferior station, who are unable to rule themselves, and require to be ruled by others, ruled not for their injury, but because it is better for every one to be ruled by what is good and prudent, best if he has it in himself, but if not, then from something external; thus we may all be friends, all guided by the same principle. This is plainly the object of law, which helps every man to rule himself and others. This principle, too, is shown in the government of children, whom we keep under control until we have established a ruler in their own minds. How then can we say that Injustice or Intemperance are profitable, or that it is an advantage to the guilty to escape punishment? It were surely better for him to be punished, and made better.

Conclusion. To maintain the harmonious working of these internal principles will be the end of all the efforts of a man of intelligence. He will honour the various branches of education only so far as they tend to produce a right frame of mind; he will value bodily health and beauty merely as affording means for the practice of temperance, cultivating the harmony of the body for the sake of the harmony of the soul. With regard to money he will gain and spend it, not influenced by the applause of the multitude, but in such ways and proportions as he thinks will best conduce to his spiritual health. He will take such honours as he thinks will make him better, rejecting all that would be likely to make him worse. He will not have much

o do with the political affairs of his country, but in his wn city, the city we have just been describing, he will ave much to do with them. This city does not exist, erhaps, cannot exist upon earth, but there may be a attern of it laid up in heaven for him who is willing o see it. But, whether it can or will exist, makes no matter, there is his citizenship, and it is with the affairs of it, and of it alone, that he will ever be concerned.

BOOK X.

Further Reasons for the Rejection of Imitative Poetry. The Immortality of the Soul, and the Final Rewards of Virtue.

The rejection of Imitative Poetry

Imitation.

Further reasons may be given for the rejection of imitative art derived from a consideration of the threefold division of the soul. But, first, what is imitation? We assume the existence of some one form (εἶδος), which includes the numerous particular things to which we apply the name. To take for example tables and couches, these are numerous, but the ideas (ἰδέαι) of them are only two, one of the couches, one of the tables. These ideas and types were made by the great workman God, who made all things, the earth with its plants and animals, and even Heaven and the things in it, and Hades. Next in order comes the earthly workman, who makes the couch or table with his eye on, and in accordance with, the idea. Lastly, comes the painter or imitator who makes you a copy of this copy. We have thus three couches, one the natural one, which, as we said, was made by God. Next that made by the workman. Lastly that made by the painter, which is thus thrice removed from truth. But painting is not only an imitation of a copy, it does not imitate the copy as it really is, merely as it appears. It fastens on a small point of things, of whose real nature it is entirely ignorant, and its highest achievement is to make children and foolish people believe, from a considerable distance, that it has really made the things themselves.

Defects of Painting.

Epic and Tragic Poetry is in like manner thrice removed from the truth, an ignorant imitation of that which it is itself a copy. It is ignorant—for if the poets had been really acquainted with the actions they describe, they would rather have performed them than have described them. It is ignorant, and this is an objection applying equally to painting and poetry, because the real knowledge with respect to anything belongs not to the person who makes or who imitates, but to the person who uses it. The user possesses science, the maker belief, the imitator has not even opinion; he does not know how the things which he imitates are good or bad, but borrows his opinions on the beautiful from the ignorant multitude. Such work is not earnest, but mere sport and trifling. And Imitative Poetry.

Further, the imitative arts are concerned only with the inferior parts of the soul. Painting gives only the apparent form and bulk of things, and thus has nothing to do with the reasoning and calculating part, the higher part of the soul, which gives the real form and bulk. Imitative poetry has a similar fault. Its object is human action; the behaviour of men in good or bad fortune. In its descriptions of this it is compelled, in order to gain the applause of the multitude, to dwell upon the emotional side of human character, on all that exhibition of passion which reason, and a regard for propriety, teach a good man to suppress. Thus its tendency is to stimulate the emotional, and weaken the reasoning part of the soul. From this results a serious deterioration of character, for the pleasure we feel from the skillfulness of the poetic imitation leads us to praise in others what we should be ashamed of in ourselves. Our self-command The Imitative Arts are concerned only with the inferior parts of the Soul.

is thus gradually weakened, and from pitying a
praising those who grieve immoderately, we come
last to grieve immoderately at our own misfortun
There is an old quarrel between Poetry and Philosoph
and the poets must excuse us if we exclude them fro
our State.

The Immortality of the Soul.

The greatest rewards of virtue,—rewards extendi
through all time, have still to be mentioned. The so
is immortal. The fact of its immortality, though
may be received with incredulity, may thus be provec

Proof of the Immortality of the Soul.

Evil is that which destroys and corrupts, good is th
which preserves and benefits; everything has its ow
special good, and has, also, its own special evil, b
which alone it can be destroyed. Iron is destroyed b
rust, sight by opthalmia. If then there exist anythin
which is harmed and corrupted, but not destroyed b
its evil, we may conclude that this cannot b
destroyed by anything else. Injustice, intemperanc
cowardice, and ignorance, corrupt and deprave th
soul; but that they do not destroy it, as disea
destroys the body, is matter of every day experienc
It would be absurd to suppose that any foreign ev
such as death, would destroy that which its own ev
did not. It may, therefore, be concluded that the so
is indestructible. The number of souls will thus alwa
be the same. The soul itself, which is of an uncom
pounded nature, must, if it is really to be known,
surveyed by reason in its natural beauty, not as
appears at present, like Glaucus disguised and m
tilated by the sea, polluted by its union with the bo

Conclusion.

Thus our argument is ended. We have proved th
justice is best for the soul; and that it is to be follow
on its own account, independently of any regard

eward or reputation. But now that it is ended, we ay fairly claim back for justice all that was given up or the sake of argument. Let it have its natural ewards. It is not despised or neglected either by Gods or men. The just man is known to the Gods; nd he who, through poverty, sickness, or any other eeming evils, endeavours to make himself as far as is possible like to God, will find all things in the end working together for his good in life and in death. Among men, the advantages of the unjust are only temporary: like bad runners, they start well but are disgraced in the end. The real prizes of life are for the just, its real punishments for the unjust.

But the rewards which the good obtain in life, are as nothing, when compared with those which await them after death. Listen to the story of Er, the son of Armenius. He was a brave man, who having been slain, once upon a time, in battle, came to life again on the twelfth day after on the funeral pile and told what he had seen. He came, he said, to a place where judges sitting between heaven and earth judged the souls of men, putting the just on their right hand, the unjust on their left. At their decision the just ascended to heaven, the unjust descended below the earth.

There the wicked were punished tenfold for their crimes; but, when their sins were sufficiently expiated, they arose again through a chasm in the earth, and, meeting the souls which had descended from the enjoyments of heaven, travelled together with them to a place where, in the midst of a light like the light of a rainbow, the distaff of necessity turns with its eight whirls. Lives of all kinds were laid before them, and each soul was compelled to choose a new life, casting

lots for priority of choice. But their happiness, they were told, would not depend so much on the lot they drew, as on the way in which they employed their life. Men, women, wild beasts, and birds, all chose as their humour led them; a pitiful, a laughable, and a wonderful sight to see. When their choice was made it was ratified by the distaff of necessity, and all were forced to drink of the river Ameles, which causes forgetfulness of all things. Then they lay down to sleep; but, at midnight, there came thunder and lightning, and the souls were carried to their birth, glancing like stars. But Er awoke and found himself on the funeral pile.

And thus was the story saved and died not, and us, too, would it save if we obey it. Let us believe that the soul is immortal; let us ever persevere in our upward course; let us practice justice with wisdom in every way; then shall we be friends both with ourselves and with the Gods; we shall have our rewards and triumphs; and both here and hereafter we shall, indeed, fare well.

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